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Comments
STUDENT REFUSAL TO PAY ABORTION-
RELATED FEES-A FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT?
In Erzinger v. Regents of the University of California the Cali-
fornia Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the state univer-
sity's use of mandatory student fees to fund student abortion
insurance. The court rejected the students' argument that such
use of their fees violated their first amendment rights offtee asso-
ciation and free exercise of religion. This Comment evaluates the
decision using recent United States Supreme Court analyses of
first amendment rights, and concludes that while the students'
free association claim was properly denied, their free exercise
claim should have been upheld.
In late 1977, three students at the University of California-San
Diego strongly objected on religious grounds to the use of a por-
tion of their mandatory student fees to fund student abortions.'
The students failed to pay those fees and sought an exemption
from the university regents. The exemption was denied and the
students were refused admission to the university for failure to
pay the total amount of the mandatory fees.
In Erzinger v. Regents of the University of California,2 the stu-
dents sued the university alleging that the compelled funding pro-
1. Brief for Appellant at 2, Erzinger v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 136 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 185 Cal. Rptr. 791, affid on rehearing, 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 187 Cal. Rptr.
164 (1982) (on fie with San Diego Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellant].
2. 136 Cal. App. 3d 1, 185 CaL Rptr. 791, affd on rehearing, 137 Cal. App. 3d
389, 187 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1982). The three students subsequently were joined in the
lawsuit by fifty-six other students from campuses within the University of Califor-
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cedure violated their first amendment rights of free exercise of
religion and free association. In rejecting the students' claims,
the California Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the uni-
versity, by using mandatory student fees to fund student abor-
tions, did not coerce the students to act or believe in a manner
contrary to their religious beliefs.3 Nor did the university compel
the students to advocate a position on abortion contrary to their
beliefs.4 The students remained free to decline abortion services
and to hold and express their anti-abortion views. The court com-
pared the university fees to general government support taxes
and followed the line of federal cases that have denied relief to
taxpayers who disagree with specific government programs.5
Once the university collected the fees, the court reasoned, they
became the property of the regents to distribute at their
discretion.6
The appellate court, however, failed to analyze the first amend-
ment issues in light of several recent United States Supreme
Court decisions. In those decisions, the Supreme Court upheld
the free exercise claim where the state indirectly conditioned re-
ceipt of a public benefit on the abandonment of religious beliefs.
The Court required states to employ an alternative method of
achieving objectives that would be less burdensome to religious
beliefs.7 In addition, the Court acknowledged the free association
right where nonunion members were compelled to financially
support the union's political activities with which the individuals
disagreed.8 In that case, the Court recognized that compelled
funding was a means of compelling individuals to communicate a
specific belief.9
nia system. The California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
denied hearings in the case.
3. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
4. Id.
5. Id. The court quoted Autenreith v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970):
[NJothing in the constitution prohibits the Congress from levying a tax
upon all persons, regardless of religion, for support of the general govern-
ment. The fact that some persons may object, on religious grounds, to
some of the things that the government does is not a basis upon which
they can claim a constitutional right not to pay a part of the tax.
See Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872
(1970); Gray v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1001 (1971).
6. Erzinger v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 166.
7. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
8. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
9. Id. at 234-36.
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This Comment explores the potential violation of the free asso-
ciation and free exercise rights of students denied university ad-
mission for refusal to pay abortion-related fees. The analysis
suggests that despite the students' strong belief that compelled
funding of abortions links them to what they believe to be an im-
moral act, they cannot prevail on their free association claim.
However, this Comment further proposes that the students are
entitled to the protection of the free exercise clause and examines
the extent to which this right should be accommodated by the
university.
FIRST AENDMENT R IGHT TO FREEDOM OF AssocIATION
In an expansive view of the first amendment, the United States
Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education found the
right to free association to be at the "heart of the First Amend-
ment."10 The Court defined free association as the right of an in-
dividual to be "free to believe as he will" and to have those beliefs
"shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by
the State."" The Court has used this principle to prohibit a state
from compelling an individual to affirm his belief in God,12 to as-
sociate with a political party,13 or to financially support a political
cause the individual may oppose.14 The students in Erzinger ar-
gued that the university violated their right to free association by
compelling them to associate with abortion through their
mandatory student fees.'5 The appellate court summarily dis-
missed the issue in a single sentence by stating that the univer-
sity did not compel the students to advocate a position on
abortion contrary to their beliefs.16 An analysis of the United
States Supreme Court's treatment of free association claims indi-
cates that the Court likely would affirm the appellate court's deci-
sion on this issue and decline to extend Abood to non-political
funding.?
The Court recognized the right to free association in West Vir-
10. Id. at 234-35.
11. Id. at 235.
12. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
13. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
14. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
15. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 26-34.
16. Erzinger v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 166.
17. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.18 In that case, the
Court emphasized the importance of the freedom of belief and de-
clared the right to be a primary aspect of the first amendment's
protection.' 9 Barnette involved a compulsory flag salute and
pledge of allegiance by children in a public elementary school dis-
trict.2 0 The Court held that forcing students to act in a manner
which affirmed a belief they did not share was contrary to the first
amendment.2' To sustain the compulsory flag salute would re-
quire the Court "to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the indi-
vidual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public
authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind."2 2 The
Court feared an "officially disciplined uniformity" of mind,23
which would result from the state compelling all individuals to
profess the belief of the state.24
The free association right was extended dramatically thirty-four
years later in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.25 The Court
in Abood held that compulsory funding of political activities with
which individuals disagreed was as contrary to the first amend-
ment as a compulsory flag salute. For the first time, the Court
recognized funding as a means of communicating ideals and asso-
ciating with beliefs. However, the Court narrowly limited the link
between funding and association to the area of political activities,
which necessarily involves the advocacy of beliefs.26 The Court
18. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
19. In a phrase often quoted in subsequent free association decisions, the
Court in Barnette stated: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to con-
fess by word or act their faith therein." Id. at 642.
20. Several Jehovah's Witnesses objected on religious grounds to the
mandatory flag salute. The Court found the flag salute unconstitutional based on
the children's right to free association-rather than free exercise of religion-rec-
ognizing that the flag salute was a means of symbolic communication. Id. at 632-
35.
21. Id. at 642.
22. Id. at 634.
23. Id. at 637.
24. A similar fear was expressed in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). In
that case, the Court held that a New Hampshire motorist could not be compelled
to display the state motto, "Live Free or Die," which was stamped on all vehicular
license plates, even though the only method of disassociation was to cover a por-
tion of the plate. The Court stated that "where the state's interest is to dissemi-
nate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot
outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for
such message." Id. at 717.
25. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
26. See id. at 235. In Abood, nonunion members were required by a Michigan
statute to pay to the union, as a condition of employment, a service charge equal
in amount to union dues. Several nonunion members objected to paying the
charge claiming opposition to collective bargaining as a whole and disapproval of
various political and other ideological activities in which the union was engaged.
[voL. 20: 837, 1983] Comment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
approved the expenditure of non-union membe fees by the union
for the support of collective bargaining activities, but not for the
support of outside political activities. The Court admitted that
the line between the two activities-collective bargaining and
political advocacy-was difficult to draw.27 But the Court's at-
tempt to do so is theoretically sound.
Compulsory political funding, unlike other types of funding,
jeopardizes the democratic process by impairing self-govern-
ment-a cornerstone of the United States political system. For a
democracy to operate successfully, individuals must be free to ad-
vocate the programs they choose.28 Compulsory funding of polit-
ical advocacy of state-supported or group-supported programs
exhausts the funds availal le for individual political expression
and creates the danger, expressed in Barnette, of an "officially
disciplined uniformity" of mind.29
The funding of established programs which already have run
their political course has been treated differently from the advo-
cacy of proposed government programs. The courts have viewed
established programs as endorsed by the majority and no longer
reliant upon the political process. 30 The danger of jeopardizing
The Court prohibited the state from requiring the nonunion members to contrib-
ute to the support of an ideological cause they opposed as a condition of maintain-
ing their jobs as public school teachers. However, the line was drawn at the
expenditure of fees for political activities. Id. at 235-36.
27. Id. at 236. See Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L REV. 565, 591
(1980) (no distinction between funds for political activities and funds for collec-
tive bargaining activities as both involve advocacy by the union of a particular
position).
28. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 234 n.31. The Court quoted
Thomas Jefferson: "IT]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical"
29. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637. But see Shif-
frin, supra note 27. Shiffrin viewed the link between compelled contributions and
freedom of belief or expression as tenuous.
[T]he invalidation of compelled contributions is surely a long step from
Barnette, where the state sought to compel individuals publicly to profess
beliefs they did not share.... Requiring individuals to make contribu-
tions to a union,... does not compel them to believe anything or to ex-
press anything, nor does it prohibit them from believing or expressing
anything.
Id. at 590-91.
30. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (objection to taxes supporting
infant mortality program denied); Autenreith v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970) (refusal to pay war taxes unlawful); Crowe v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 396 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1968) (objection to wel-
fare program taxes denied).
the democratic process no longer exists once a program is estab-
lished by majority vote of the governing body. Once this stage is
reached, the courts are concerned with the potential interference
with legislative decisions if funding exemptions are granted to
those who disagree with an established, politically-responsive
government program.3 1
RIGHT OF FREE ASSOCIATION APPLIED TO PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
Although the decision-making process within the university
system differs from that in the general taxpayer situation, the ef-
fect is similar in threatening the "binding quality" of the univer-
sity regents' decisions. In the university setting, major policy
decisions regarding nonacademic university programs, such as
abortion funding, generally are not made by direct political repre-
sentatives of the students. 32 Decisions exclusively affecting stu-
dents could potentially be made without any student
participation.33 The regents, in effect, compel students to support
their decisions through financial contributions, even though the
students may strongly disagree with the decisions. The regents
are not directly responsible to the students.34
The concerns that led the Supreme Court in Abood to prohibit
compulsory funding of political activities, however, are not pres-
ent in the university fee situation. Compelled funding of an es-
tablished university program does not force students to spend
funds that were earmarked for the support of an opposing view-
point. The effect of accommodating every student's viewpoint on
all regents' decisions would be to destroy the regents' discretion-
31. Accordingly, in Autenreith v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970), the court rejected the taxpayers' first amendment claims
and refused to refund the portions of their federal income taxes that supported
military activities in Vietnam. The court stated:
The fact that some persons may object,. . . to some of the things that the
government does is not a basis upon which they can claim a constitutional
right not to pay a part of the tax .... If every citizen could refuse to pay
all or part of his taxes, ... the ability of the government to function could
be impaired or even destroyed.
Id. at 588-89.
32. Federal administrative agencies are granted extensive decision-making
power, sometimes involving major policy decisions. K. DAvis, AD nSTRATrvE LAw
TREATISE § 3.3 (2d ed. 1978).
33. The state constitution allows for a student representative on the board at
the discretion of the regents. CAI. CONST. art. IX, § 9(c). The constitution also re-
quires public board meetings which students may attend. CA.. CONsT. art. IX,
§ 9(g). The effect of student input on the board, however, is unknown.
34. Under the California Constitution, the university regents are appointed by
the governor, with majority approval by the state senate. CAl- CONsT. art. IX,
§ 9(a). Non-resident students have no input into the appointment of the regents
since they are ineligible to vote for the state governor and senators.
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ary power specifically granted to them by the state constitution.
3 5
Student funding of abortion-related services is not comparable to
the compelled funding of a political cause. Funding of a univer-
sity program, although possibly contrary to the beliefs of the ma-
jority of students, does not pose the danger of "officially
disciplined uniformity" of mind which the Supreme Court feared
in Barnette and Abood. The Supreme Court would be unlikely to
extend its link between funding and association beyond political
advocacy to the university fee situation.
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
The students' second contention in Erzinger was that their right
to free exercise of religion was unconstitutionally infringed by the
university in denying them admission because of their religious
objections to paying abortion-related fees.3 6 The appellate court
rejected the students' claim by stating that the university in no
way directly compelled them to alter their beliefs.37 Recent
Supreme Court analysis rejects the "direct compulsion" require-
ment and gives broad meaning to the free exercise clause, possi-
bly preferring it over the establishment clause.
3 8
Religion in the United States is protected by the first amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits govern-
ment infringement on the free exercise of religion and
government establishment of religion.39 The two religion clauses
historically have been at odds with each other because the expan-
sion of the protection provided by one clause necessarily in-
fringes on the protected rights provided by the other. Courts
often have struggled with the internal conflict between the
clauses: recognition of free exercise threatens to establish reli-
35. The constitution explicitly insulates the regents from political and sectar-
ian influence, thus granting them autonomy in the administration of the univer-
sity. CAT. CONST. art. IX § 9(f).
36. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 50-57.
37. Erzinger v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 166.
38. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment See. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
717-18 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. L The first amendment provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit the free exercise
thereof- or abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people
peaceably to assemble, or to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
gion, while denial on establishment grounds threatens to infringe
on free exercise.
Several commentators suggest that the history of the first
amendment requires that the free exercise clause prevail when
the two clauses clash.40 According to one commentator, the con-
sensus at the time of the Constitutional Convention was not to
strike down any requested exemption to government regulations
when a remote establishment argument could be made.41 An es-
tablishment argument is plausible any time an exemption is re-
quested. The Supreme Court has recognized that free exercise
questions cannot be resolved simply by finding a "neutral" regula-
tion complying with the establishment clause.42 For the free exer-
cise clause to have any purpose at all, it must have a "reach of its
own. 43
The Supreme Court has never adopted a strict neutrality theory
that treats all individuals the same even if such treatment would
harm some because of their religious beliefs.44 Rather, the Court
has preferred a broader neutrality standard that allows differenti-
ated treatment of individuals to achieve comparable results.45
The Court has recognized in several recent cases that there are
necessary relationships between government and religion, that
the government cannot be indifferent to religion in American life,
and that government may, and sometimes must, accommodate its
institutions and programs to individuals' religious convictions.46
The Court gave broad meaning to the free exercise clause in
Sherbert v. Verner.4 7 In Sherbert, a Sabbatarian was denied un-
employment compensation benefits because she refused to work
on Saturdays. The state unemployment compensation act pro-
vided that claimants were ineligible for benefits if they refused,
without good cause, to accept available work. The state employ-
40. L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 819 (1978); see Giannella, Reli-
gious Liberty, Non.Establishment and Doctrinal Development, 80 HAiv. L. REV.
1381, 1389-90 (1967).
41. L. TAME, supra note 40, at 819.
42. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
719-20 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963).
43. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971).
44. For example, in Yoder, the Amish were not required to send their children
to public or private school after the eighth grade. The Court's decision resulted in
differentiated treatment of the Amish. The state's mandatory 16-year school at-
tendance law was not applied strictly. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
45. The broader neutrality theory was first recognized by the Court in Zorach
v. Caluson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), upholding a program of released time for prayer off
public school premises.
46. See cases cited supra note 42.
47. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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ment security commission denied appellant's application for ben-
efits because of her refusal to work Saturdays.4 8
The Court overruled the commission and ordered the state to
grant an exception to an otherwise neutral statute to accommo-
date appellant's religious beliefs. The Court declared that an ex-
ception would not violate the establishment clause because the
exception "reflects nothing more than the governmental obliga-
tion of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not
represent [the] involvement of religious with secular institutions
which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall."49
Several years later, in Walz v. Tax Commission,50 the Court fur-
ther explained that the historical purpose of the establishment
clause was to prevent "sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."51 Providing
unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians who refuse to work on
Saturday does not establish religion within the historical meaning
of the first amendment. The Court recognizes that religious
groups or individuals may be given special treatment to receive
the same benefits as their secular counterparts.
2
The question of how to treat religious groups and individuals
has changed over the years as the state has expanded its role in
providing benefits and structuring society. To withhold all public
benefits from religious groups in an effort to maintain strict neu-
trality of government regulations would frustrate the purposes of
the religion clauses.53 The Court in Sherbert viewed the exemp-
tion to the state unemployment compensation act as the removal
of a barrier to appellant's religious practice rather than as govern-
ment aid to religion. The barrier was created when the state "un-
mistakably" pressured appellant to forgo her religious practice.54
The commission's ruling forced her to "choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order
48. Id. at 401.
49. Id. at 409.
50. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
51. Id. at 668.
52. Note, Constitutional Law: The Religion Clauses-A Free Rein to Free Exer-
cise?, 11 STETSON L. REV. 386, 400 (1982).
53. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Non-Establishment and Doctrinal Develop-
ment" Part II, 81 HARv. I IEV. 513, 515 (1968).
54. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404.
to accept work, on the other hand."s5 The Court recognized that
such an indirect burden was as intolerable as if the government
directly imposed a fine against appellant for her Saturday wor-
ship.5 6 Sherbert established that the free exercise clause protects
not only direct government interference in beliefs or practices,
but also government schemes which indirectly burden the prac-
tice of religion.5
7
After finding an undue burden on appellant's free exercise
rights, the Court in Sherbert imposed a balancing test with the
burden suffered by appellant weighed against the benefit
achieved by the government regulation. The Court's focus was on
the individual rather than on the regulation; this represented a
change from previous free exercise decisions that focused on the
validity of the legislation.58 In Sherbert, the Court looked first to
the sincerity of appellant's religious belief and then to the burden
placed upon that belief by the state. The Court then evaluated
the government interest in the state regulation.5 9 The Court
found that appellant's failure to work on Saturday was religiously
motivated in fact and that the state placed an undue burden on
appellant by compelling her to choose between her religion and
the benefits. In scrutinizing the state's interest, the Court re-
jected the danger of spurious claims and the difficulty of deter-
mining sincerity of belief as compelling government interests to
justify the free exercise infringement.60 The Court noted that the
state had not demonstrated that an exemption would seriously di-
lute the unemployment compensation fund. The only significant
interest the state could argue in Sherbert was the interest in treat-
ing religious objectors the same as anyone else. The Court clearly
rejected "religion-blindness" as a sufficient justification for refus-
ing to grant exemptions, 61 especially when the results of remain-
ing studiously "neutral" were as drastic as they were to the
55. Id.
56. Id. at 403-04.
57. See id. at 403-06.
58. Note, supra note 52, at 391. E.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
(Court upheld statute mandating Sunday as a uniform day of rest despite objec-
tions by Orthodox Jewish merchant). Braunfeld was distinguished by the court in
Sherbert by noting that the state's compelling interest in a uniform day of rest in
Braunfeld could not be achieved by a less burdensome alternative. Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. at 408. The same argument is appropriate in distinguishing
Braunfeld from Erzinger.
59. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406-09.
60. Id. at 407.
61. Id. at 409. The Court in Sherbert did not have to inquire into less restric-
tive alternatives since the Court concluded that the challenged regulation served
no compelling state interest. Id. at 406-07.
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Sabbatarian in Sherbert.6 2
The decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder 6 3 continued the Court's em-
phasis on individual free exercise rights. The Court in Yoder
granted members of the Amish religion an exception to a state
law requiring school attendance until age sixteen. Respondents
declined to send their children to public or private school after
the eighth grade. The Amish parents instead provided continuing
informal vocational education to prepare their children for life in
the rural Amish community. The Court found that the state's in-
terest in universal education, although a highly legitimate and
compelling objective, "was not totally free from a balancing pro-
cess when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such
as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause
"64
An important aspect noted by the Court in both Sherbert and
Yoder was the centrality of the religious objections to their re-
spective religions. In Sherbert, Saturday worship was a cardinal
tenet of the Seventh Day Adventists Church. Likewise, in Yoder,
the Court expounded on the history of the Amish belief in infor-
mal community education and the vital role that belief and daily
conduct played in the survival of the Amish communities. 65
In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division,66 the Court expanded the protection of the free exercise
clause to beliefs central to the individual objector, but not neces-
sarily central to the individual's church.67 In Thomas, a Jehovah's
Witness objected to being transferred to a section that produced
tank turrets in the plant where he worked. His objections were
based on religious grounds and his personal reading of the Scrip-
tures. He had not, however, objected to working previously in a
section that did not involve the direct production of arms. Appel-
lant's employer ignored his objections and he resigned. Thereaf-
ter, he was denied state unemployment benefits based on the
state's requirement that no benefits be granted for voluntary res-
ignations without good cause.
62. The appellant in Sherbert was denied unemployment benefits which could
have affected her immediate economic survival.
63. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
64. I. at 214.
65. Id. at 222-27.
66. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
67. Id. at 715-16.
The Court in Thomas, indicating its continued support of Sher-
bert, applied a balancing test and held as unconstitutional the
withholding of unemployment benefits based on appellant's reli-
gious beliefs, despite the personal and philosophical nature of
those beliefs. 68 Appellant's church publicly opposed war, but Had
never expressed a formal opposition to his working in a munitions
plant. The Court noted that the "guarantee of free exercise [was]
not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a
religious sect."69 The decision implied a recognition of Justice
Douglas' dissent in Yoder that rejection of any claims based on
personal conscience would be a retreat from the liberality estab-
lished in the war draft cases.70 The Thomas decision demon-
strates that when free exercise issues are raised, religious claims
should not be examined in terms of the majority's concept of reli-
gion, but in terms of the role the beliefs assume in the individ-
ual's life. The Court said in Thomas that "religious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others
in order to merit First Amendment protection."7'
The narrow function of the courts to determine whether appel-
lant's actions are religiously motivated involves inquiry, to some
extent, into the sincerity of the religious claims. One commenta-
tor stated that "a minimal inquiry of sincerity is necessary to
avoid making a mockery of religion and government, ' 72 especially
when individuals request an exemption that would amount to
special treatment by the state based on their religious beliefs. So-
ciety deserves protection from unnecessary disruption of govern-
mental programs which would result if first amendment
protections were given to claims based on insincerely held be-
liefs.73 Following Thomas, the courts' scrutiny should be strictly
limited to the sincerity, not the truth, of the claimed religious
beliefs.
The Court in Thomas found that appellant's resignation was re-
ligiously motivated, and that the state unduly burdened the exer-
cise of his religion by pressuring him to act contrary to his beliefs.
68. Id The Court previously stated in Yoder that philosophical and personal
beliefs rather than religious beliefs do not "rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
69. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. at 715-16.
70. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 247-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Welsh
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). In
Welsh, the Court stated that conscientious objector status would be granted to
those "whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious be-
liefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a
part of an instrument of war." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 344.
71. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. at 714.
72. Gianella, supra note 40, at 1417.
73. Id. at 1418.
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"[A] person may not be compelled to choose between the exer-
cise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise
available public program."74 Although the state did not directly
compel the violation of religious beliefs, appellant was faced with
an impermissie choice of quitting his job or abandoning those
beliefs. The state, by denying him unemployment benefits, indi-
rectly pressured appellant into modifying his behavior and
thereby violated his religious beliefs. The Court recognized that
the coercive impact on appellant was indistinguishable from the
indirect yet undue burden found in Sherbert: "While the compul-
sion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is none-
theless substantial."75 In both cases, the termination of
employment was the result of religious objections to changed con-
ditions in employment.7 6
In following the balancing test established in Sherbert, the
Court in Thomas noted that the mere burden on religious practice
by the government does not mean that an exemption automati-
cally will be granted.7 7 The state may justify its infringement by
showing that it is employing the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing a compelling state interest. The Court, however, found no
state interest sufficiently compelling to justify the burden placed
upon appellant's religious liberty.78 The Court rejected as insuffi-
cient the allegations that fraudulent claims would cause wide-
spread unemployment and depletion of state funds, and that
detailed inquiry into employees' religious convictions would vio-
late the establishment clause. In upholding appellant's religious
claim, the Court quoted from Yoder: "[T]he essence of all that
has been said and written on the subject is that only those inter-
ests of the highest order ... can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion."79 The allegations of the state
amounted to "untested assertions" which the Court in Sherbert
found inadequate to justify government infringement of religious
liberty.80
74. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. at 716.
75. Id. at 718.
76. In Sherbert, appellant was dismissed because she refused to work when
the plant went to a six-day work week. In Thomas, appellant resigned when his
employer switched him to a different section of the munitions plant.
77. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment See. Div., 450 U.S. at 718.
78. Id at 719.
79. Id. at 718 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215).
80. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406-09; People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 723-
RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE APPLIED TO MANDATORY STUDENT FEES
Denial of university admission to students who fail to pay abor-
tion-related fees is analogous to the denial of unemployment ben-
efits in Sherbert and Thomas. The state university is denying an
important benefit-public education-because of conduct man-
dated by religious belief, thereby placing substantial pressure on
the students to modify their behavior in violation of their
beliefs.81
The students' religious beliefs relevant here focus on the view
that life begins at conception and that abortion, therefore, in-
volves the unjustified taking of a human life-murder. Such be-
liefs are not merely personal readings of the Scriptures as the
beliefs were in Thomas. Several orthodox religions have publicly
declared their opposition to abortion and to any collaboration by
their members in abortion.82 Other faiths have encouraged mem-
bers to search their own consciences to determine the morality of
abortion and have supported them in their decisions.83
The centrality of beliefs to orthodox religions was not a decisive
factor in the Thomas free exercise analysis.84 The Court in
Thomas implied that it would accept freedom of conscience
claims by nontheistic but committed humanists if the belief met
the test adopted in the conscientious objector cases: Does the
claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as
an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of a religious individ-
ual?85 In the students' case, their "religious" claims-whether or-
thodox or humanistic-rest on their concern and respect for
fellow "human beings," which may deserve greater judicial re-
spect than claims resting on a "seemingly arbitrary divine com-
mand."86 Although the students are not being compelled to take a
life themselves, they are unable to distinguish the moral culpabil-
ity involved in actually aborting a child themselves from that in-
volved in financially supporting another's abortion.87 Such a
24, 40 Cal. Rptr. 60, 75, 394 P.2d 813, 819 (1964) (court upheld challenge to state stat-
ute prohibiting use of peyote for religious purposes. Court found state interest in
effective enforcement as insufficient).
81. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. at
717-18; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403-04.
82. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 692-97 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
83. Id. at 697-702.
84. In Thomas, the Court approved the personal beliefs of appellant as being
sufficient for a free exercise claim. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text
85. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.
86. Giannella, supra note 40, at 1421.
87. See Comment, War Tax Refusal Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1980 Wis.
L. REv. 753, 768 n.81 (1980).
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concern is central to those objecting to financial support of abor-
tion on sincere religious or moral grounds.
By indirectly pressuring the students to abandon their beliefs
against abortion, the state is presenting the students with the
same choice the Court found impermissible in Sherbert and
Thomas. The students are compelled to choose between staying
in school and violating their beliefs by financially supporting
abortion, or following their beliefs by not attending the public uni-
versity and denying themselves a low-cost and possibly better ed-
ucation.8 8 Such a dilemma impermissibly burdens religious
freedom.89 Although the students are not being compelled by the
state to change their beliefs against abortion, they are being pres-
sured to act against their belief. An identical pressure by the
state to act against sincere religious beliefs was placed on appel-
lants in Sherbert and Thomas. In both cases, the Court found an
unconstitutional infringement on free exercise of religion.90 "The
free exercise clause was at the very least designed to guarantee
freedom of conscience by preventing any degree of compulsion in
matters of belief."91
The benefit being denied the students is public education,
which is not a "right" in this society but merely a "privilege." Un-
employment compensation benefits also are a privilege, yet the
Court in Sherbert rejected the argument that the state compensa-
tion statute should be upheld on the ground that unemployment
compensation benefits are not a "right."92 The Court stated: "It is
too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and ex-
pression may be infringed by the denial of... a benefit or privi-
lege." 93 Although the state has no obligation to provide public
education, once it enacts such legislation it may not unreasonably
88. The state university may offer the best program in the students' area of
study.
89. As recognized in Sherbert and Thomas, denial of admission does not have
to be based directly on religious beliefs. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying
text.
90. In Barnette, the children also were not coerced to change their beliefs, but
were unconstitutionally compelled to act against their belief. Barnette differs from
Erzinger in that the children in Barnette were directly compelled to act, whereas
the university students in Erzinger are being pressured to act
91. L. TRIBE, supra note 40, at 818 (emphasis added).
92. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404-05.
93. Id. at 404. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (plaintiffs were un-
constitutionally denied tax exemptions provided for veterans for failing to sub-
scribe to oaths that they did not advocate the overthrow of the government).
condition receipt of the benefit on an act that would inhibit free
exercise of religion. Such state action would result in "subtle dis-
crimination" against students with anti-abortion beliefs.94
The denial of unemployment benefits arguably has a more seri-
ous, immediate impact on an individual than the denial of a pub-
lic education. The loss of economic benefits possibly could affect
individual survival, whereas the denial of a public education may
mean no more than requiring an individual to attend a private
university. However, the result may be as severe as denying an
individual a college education entirely if attending a private uni-
versity is economically unfeasible. Any distinction between tem-
porary economic benefits and educational benefits is not
significant. The Court's decisions in Sherbert and Thomas did not
focus on the result of the government's infringement on the free
exercise of religion. No inquiry was made into the effect on appel-
lants if the unemployment benefits were not received. 95 The
Court in Thomas prohibited the state from conditioning receipt of
an "important benefit" upon conduct proscribed by a religious
faith.96 The Court forbade the state from pressuring individuals
into modifying behavior and violating religious beliefs. Such pres-
sure would be especially strong if imposed upon an 18-year-old
seeking a college education to improve his or her future economic
position.
After determining that free exercise rights were in fact bur-
dened by the state, the Court did not inquire into the importance
of the benefit involved, but rather examined the state's interest in
the burdensome regulation. In Sherbert and Thomas, the Court
rejected the danger of spurious claims and the difficulty of deter-
mining the sincerity of religious beliefs as sufficient state inter-
ests to justify infringement of first amendment rights.97 In the
students' case, the California appellate court compared the uni-
versity fee to general government support taxes and found a com-
pelling state interest in maintaining a uniform fee system and in
preserving the discretionary power of the university regents.
Federal courts have found such state interests in tax situations to
be sufficient justification for not allowing an exemption for reli-
gious objections to funding of government programs.9 8 However,
94. L. TRIBE, supra note 40, at 818.
95. Appellants in Sherbert and Thomas may not have needed the benefits to
survive. Unemployment benefits are not paid on the basis of need, but on the ba-
sis of lack of employment. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. CODE §§ 1251, 1252 (West 1972 &
Supp. 1982).
96. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. at 717.
97. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406-07; Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. at 719.
98. See Autenreith v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969), cer. denied, 397 U.S.
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the comparison between general taxes and the abortion-related
student fees is mistaken. The objectionable fees in Erzinger are
being used by the university to cover the costs of insurance cover-
age for student abortions, not to fund the general operation of the
university. The abortion insurance program is a special function
of the university whereby some students may withdraw without
destroying the program.9 9 Those who do not pay do not receive
the benefit of the insurance coverage. The program is not de-
stroyed, but simply becomes slightly more costly for those who
participate. The cost increase would be minimal as the percent-
age of each student's fees that is applied toward the abortion cov-
erage is minimal.100 The university made no showing in Erzinger
that the potential cost increase would prohibit other students
1036 (1970); Crowe v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 396 F.2d 766 (8th Cir.
1968).
99. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). In Lee, the Court rejected a
first amendment claim by an Amish employer who refused to withhold social se-
curity taxes from his employees or to pay the employer's share of such taxes. The
employer claimed that payment of the tax was against his religious beliefs which
required the Amish to provide for their fellow members the kind of assistance con-
templated by the social security system. The Amish religion prohibited both ac-
ceptance-of social security benefits and contributions to the social secuxity system.
Id. at 255.
In denying the employer an exemption, the Court applied the balancing test ar-
ticulated in Sherbert and Thomas, and held that the religious claim in this case
was outweighed by the compelling government interest in administering a nation-
wide social security system. The Court noted the extensiveness of the social se-
curity program and the increasing costs before holding that "mandatory
participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system."
The Court further noted that voluntary participation would make administration
of the program "difficult, if not impossible." Id. at 258.
The distinction between the payment of general support taxes and the payment
of social security taxes was rejected by the Court. But the rejection was narrowly
drawn "for purposes of this case." Id. at 260. The Court's concern with "myriad
exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs" and the ever-increasing
costs of the social security program led the Court to deny the Amish's free exer-
cise claim. As in Braunfeld, the court found that the compelling government inter-
est could not be achieved by a less burdensome alternative. Id. at 259-60; see
supra note 58. These concerns are not present in Erzinger. The issue in Erzinger
is confined to the challenged payment of abortion-related fees; the court need not
determine the validity of a first amendment claim to refuse to pay more general
student fees. "Myriad exceptions" to the abortion-related fees will not result and
less burdensome alternatives are available. See infra text accompanying notes
102-05.
100. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 57. At the time the lawsuit was
filed, students were paying $13 a quarter for all health care services. University
officials estimated that 275 abortions were paid for under the plan each year. The
San Diego Union, Sept. 22, 1982, at A-9, col. 1.
from participating in the abortion insurance program. 0 1
The state has a legitimate interest in providing low-cost abor-
tion insurance to students as an alternative method of birth con-
trol. But students objecting to the fees on sincere religious
grounds should not have to pay into the program so that their fel-
low students can have the cheapest protection possible. Under
Thomas, "[t]he state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by
showing that [the legislation] is the least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest."102 In Erzinger, other
less restrictive alternatives are available to the university. One
plausible alternative would be for the university to offer students
the option of two insurance programs, one with and one without
abortion coverage. Such an option would allow the university to
continue providing abortion insurance, albeit at a slightly higher
cost per student, while not infringing on the religious beliefs of
those who object to abortion funding.
The optional insurance program alternative would involve an
extension of Sherbert and Thomas because the consequence of
the alternative would be a slight disadvantage to other students
in the form of higher insurance costs. In the unemployment com-
pensation cases, the court-ordered exemption had no effect on
others. Granting the benefits to the religious objectors in no way
lessened the benefits granted to others. The disadvantage in Erz-
inger can be justified on the ground that the increase will be min-
imal while the disadvantage to the objecting students if the
alternative is not provided--denial of admission to the university
or abandonment of religious beliefs-is far greater and, therefore,
requires greater judicial protection. Furthermore, the objecting
students have a first amendment right that is being infringed by
the state, while the other students cannot claim a constitutional
right to a state-funded abortion. 0 3
Alternatively, the university could provide the strict option of
participating in the university insurance program, including the
abortion coverage, or opting out of the program entirely. Stu-
dents choosing not to participate in the insurance program would
receive the benefits of the on-campus health facilities but would
be denied the additional insurance coverage for more extensive
health care. The possibly harsh effect of receiving no insurance
coverage would discourage all students but those with sincere be-
liefs against abortion from opting out of the program, which
101. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 57.
102. Thomas v. Review Bd. for the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. at 718.
103. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (state not required to pay expenses inci-
dent to nontherapeutic abortion for indigent women).
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would keep the cost close to current levels. This alternative like-
wise impinges on the students' free exercise rights by condition-
ing receipt of a state benefit-low cost health insurance--on
abandonment of religious beliefs. The infringement possibly can
be justified by the compelling state interest in providing abortion
coverage and discouraging insincere religious objections, and the
minimal impact on the objecting student of not receiving state-
provided insurance coverage.
If the courts are uncomfortable with the increased cost of abor-
tion insurance, another alternative exists to the mandatory fee re-
quirement. The university could offer students the opportunity to
request that no part of their fees be used for abortion-related pur-
poses. 0 4 To accomplish this, a trust fund could be established
into which the objecting students' fees would be placed. A per-
centage of the trust fund equal to the percentage of the general
fees appropriated for abortion-related services would be used to
fund a university program unrelated to abortion, such as a cul-
tural arts program or building program. The remainder of the
trust fund money would be appropriated to the same programs
and in the same percentage as the general fees.
By creating the special trust fund, the students would be as-
sured that none of their fees was used to support abortion serv-
ices. As a practical matter, the university would not be losing
money for abortion services because the same total would be paid
to the university by each student. Thus, the state interest in rais-
ing adequate funding for the insurance program would be satis-
fied because the amount collected would be unaffected. The
students would be treated fairly because all would pay the same
amount. The trust fund alternative offers a less onerous means of
collecting mandatory student fees without compelling students to
violate their religious beliefs against abortion funding.
The drawback of the trust fund alternative is that it may not
satisfy the religious objections raised by the students. Even
though the objecting students would not be paying directly into
the abortion-related program, their fees would allow the univer-
sity to offer the abortion insurance at the same cost per student
as currently provided. The objecting students would be indirectly
assisting the abortion funding. The other students would not feel
104. A similar proposal was made to accommodate taxpayer objections to war
taxes. Comment, supra note 87, at 775-77.
the effect of the religious objections because their fees would not
increase. The trust fund alternative may be only a "bandaid" ap-
proach to the problem--covering up the first amendment infringe-
ment by accounting methods but not actually curing the students'
religious objections to abortion funding. Some students may not
be satisfied in knowing that their particular dollar was not di-
rectly supporting abortions. Rather than placing the objecting
students' abortion-related fees into an existing program, the uni-
versity could establish a new program specifically for these fees,
such as a scholarship program. Earmarking the fees for a new
program would preclude the university from transferring funds to
the abortion insurance program and would require other students
to pay slightly more for the abortion coverage.
None of the suggested alternatives raises an establishment
clause issue as no religious group or individual would be given a
special advantage. The insurance option programs would be
available to all students regardless of their religious beliefslOs and
the trust fund programs would treat all students equally in as-
sessing student fees.
CONCLUSION
The Court's acknowledgment that compelled funding can be a
form of unconstitutional compelled association was strictly lim-
ited by the Court in Abood to the financial support of political ac-
tivities. The danger of jeopardizing the political process is not
present in the university setting where the student programs
have been established by the regents and are not involved in the
political process. For this reason, the students' refusal to pay
abortion-related fees cannot be justified on a right to free
association.
However, the courts' summary dismissal of the value the stu-
dents obviously have placed on their religious beliefs would be in-
consistent with previous Supreme Court cases. The students
were forced to lose the benefit of a public education to avoid vio-
lating their religious beliefs against abortion funding.lO6 Not all
religious objections to government regulations can, or should, be
105. An argument could be made that offering the insurance options to all stu-
dents will result in only women opting for the abortion coverage program. To
avoid a limited number of students choosing the abortion coverage, the university
could offer the abortion coverage with more generally desired coverage to en-
courage more students to choose the abortion coverage program. This would en-
sure that only students with sincerely held beliefs against abortion would select
the non-abortion option.
106. Erzinger v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d at 391, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 165.
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accommodated.10 7 The judicial system places the duty on the
courts to say where the individual freedom ends and where the
state's power begins. The Supreme Court has determined that
the line is drawn by the balancing of religious burdens and state
interests in each case.108 The burden on religious rights can be
justified only if the state is employing the least restrictive means
to achieve a compelling state objective.109
The state interest in providing low-cost abortion insurance for
its students is to minimize the "detrimental effects of students'
health conditions on their academic performance."" 0 But the
state's objective can be attained by alternatives less burdensome
to the students' religious beliefs. These alternatives include:
1. offering an optional insurance program that does not provide
abortion coverage; 2. permitting the option of receiving no insur-
ance coverage at all; 3. establishing a trust fund into which the ob-
jecting students could pay their fees, with all the fees being
applied toward non-abortion-related programs.
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107. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (social security tax exemption
denied); Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination
upheld); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (religious polygamy unlaw-
ful); Autenreith v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 1036
(1970) (tax regulations upheld).
108. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403.
109. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. at 718.
110. Erzinger v. Regents of the Univ. of CaL, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 187 Cal.
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